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INTRODUCTION: MAKING OTHERS DO THE WORK

I understand why the content industry pushes for these
measures. They're trying to protect an analog business model
in the digital environment, and that's difficult and expensive;
and treating one's customers like criminals is bad for PR.
Accordingly, the content industry has every incentive to make
others do the workfor it.I

If ranchers surrounded their fields with fences that were two feet
high and then demanded that the law prevent their horses from escaping,
or insisted that there was a general social obligation to return any horses
* Professor of Law, Pettit College of Law, Ohio Northern University. I would like to thank Jay
Dratler, Sam Oddi, and Jeff Samuels for sponsoring the Second Annual Akron IP Scholars Forum
and for their fine hospitality. I would also like to thank Forum participants for helpful and lively
comments, questions, and criticisms. Finally, I would like to thank Dean David Crago for generous
research support.
1. Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Dem. California, speaking in opposition to the Prioritizing Resources
and Organization for Intellectual Property Act Cong. Rec. H10229-02, 10237, 2008 WL 4373168.
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that had managed to escape, their request would be met with undying
laughter. Yet that is precisely what the copyright industries are doing
rather successfully, and they have managed this feat in part under the
theories of contributory infringement and vicarious liability. The legal
system has dealt solemnly with these secondary liability concepts of
infringement without fully considering their significance, with the
unhappy result that they may seem like commonplace and
unobjectionable legal principles. Of course, they are the progeny of
dance halls and apartments for rent--I refer here to the Fonovisa2 test for
the imposition of secondary liability--so they have a pedigree, but as
they have become more prominent, they have assumed a significance
that threatens to take us far from the traditional contours of copyright via
the imposition of a widespread social obligation to protect the rights of
copyright holders.
The emergence of secondary liability as a matter of real social and
legal concern signals a battle to redefine social relations in light of the
growing instability of intellectual property, and although I focus on
copyright, the issue has arisen in patent and trademark law as well. The
extension of secondary liability represents just one part of a much
broader tendency toward the imposition of a general social duty to
preserve the property of the content industries and to give them control
of the means of distribution present and future, real and hypothetical.
This battle reflects the belief that there is a crisis in the law, which
is hardly open to doubt, but there is obvious disagreement about what
the crisis is. While the House of Representatives was gathered on
September 28, 2008, in a weekend session called in order to consider an
unprecedented $700 billion "bailout package" which it rejected on
September 30, it passed the Prioritizing Resources and Organization for
Intellectual Property Act by a vote of 381 to 41. 3 This piece of
legislation is not a secondary liability law as such, but it furthers the
tendency to create broad responsibility for the enforcement of
intellectual property rights.4 That Congress thought it was suitable to
pass the bill at a time of recognized financial emergency argues that it
perceives a crisis, particularly given that the legislation marks $35
million for further enforcement and educational measures.5

2. See Fonovisa, Inc. v. Cherry Auction, Inc., 76 F.3d 259, 264-65 (9th Cir. 1996)
3. HOUSE CLEARS PRO IP BILL FOR WHITE HOUSE IN WEEKEND SESSION, 76 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 752, 752 (Oct. 3, 2008).
4. See id.
5. Id.
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Quite a different crisis comes into view when secondary liability is
considered as part of this general reassignment of duties intended to
protect copyright holders, a crisis defined by the extension of the rights
of intellectual property and the diminution of rights that might derogate
from them. At the same time, the tendency to make us all the keepers of
the content industries' property is balanced, to some as-yet uncertain
degree, by two opposing tendencies. One of these is the continuing
trend toward the efficient and inexpensive distribution of information,
the most famous example of which is achieved via the "p2p" software
that has been so much in the news. Of course, the availability of such
software has helped to trigger the crisis, but it has proved to be resilient
enough to provide resistance as well.
Another more recent development is the appearance of legal
skepticism regarding the extension of intellectual property rights. When
the Supreme Court's decision in eBay v. MercExchange6 first came
down many wondered whether it signaled real change; it is now apparent
that the answer to that question is yes, at least in patent law. The
Supreme Court has sent several important messages to the Federal
Circuit, and the messages appear to have been received. In Bilski,7 the
Federal Circuit has shown its willingness to reconsider its own
precedents to the point of imperiling business method patents. Chief
Judge Michel has twice taken the unusual step of asking lawyers to
request an en banc rehearing in controversial cases. 8 One reason he has
called for such review is undoubtedly to allow his court to produce better
law, and another is probably to immunize the Federal Circuit from
Supreme Court review. The Chief Judge admits, as he must, that the
Supreme Court has a superior voice that must be listened to, but he also
hints that the Supreme Court is only right because it is last, and that his
own court is actually better at patent law. 9 Whatever the reason for the
Federal Circuit's reexamination of its own approach to patent law in
recent years, it seems to be producing real changes and a retrenchment in
what has been an expansive view of the reach of patent law.
Likewise, the Supreme Court's ruling in Quanta v. LG'0 indicates
that the Court's interest in patent law did not die with the eBay decision,

6. eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
7. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
8. See, e.g., Eileen McDermott, Make Better use of Federal Circuit, says Chief Judge,
Managing Intellectual Property (Sept. 25, 2008) http://www.managingip.com/Article/2017893/
Make-better-use-of-Federal-Circuit-says-Chief-Judge-.html.

9. Id.
10. Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG Elecs, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2109 (Fed. Cir. 2008)
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and as in eBay the Court has expressed its disapproval of unwarranted
patent exceptionalism by endorsing the belief that method patents must
be made to behave like other patents, even with respect to patent
exhaustion." Thus, there is opposition to the general tendency to provide
additional protection to intellectual property owners, coming in part
from the enormous pressure generated by technological advances and in
part from judicial skepticism regarding the nature of the crisis.
On the other hand, there has been no similar direction from the
Supreme Court on the specific question of secondary liability in
copyright. Presented with the opportunity to clarify the issue in
Grokster2 , the Court decided instead to focus on the socially trivial
issue of third-party inducement of infringement. We have thus been left
in a peculiar position: In the most famous of a series of cases which
makes a defendant of an entity who was not a party to direct
infringement, the Court declined to look beyond the parties in the case,
which begs the very question raised by the secondary liability issue. In
copyright, there is no court comparable to the Federal Circuit in patent,
or at least no court that can exert a superintendency over the law in the
way that the Federal Circuit can.
There are advantages to a
decentralized approach, and the Federal Circuit's appellate monopoly
probably contributed to the problems that are now being addressed.
Nonetheless, a specialized court also provides an opportunity for
responsible oversight, and for the moment it seems unlikely that
copyright will receive anything like the attention that patent is currently
receiving.
Therefore, the secondary liability results are likely to be more
haphazard in the area of copyright and trademark than in patent law.
Cases such as Tiffany v. eBay13 and Perfect]0 v. Visa14 have resisted the
easy imposition of secondary liability; as the Ninth Circuit declared in
PerfectlO, we "decline to create any of the radical new theories of
liability advocated by Perfect 10 and the dissent."' 15 Nonetheless, it is
not clear that the law has developed a uniform means of assessing such
claims, and it is significant that the dissent in PerfectlO was written by
the Hon. Alex Kozinski, no slouch when it comes to intellectual property
issues. According to Judge Kozinski, the credit cards were "easily liable
for indirect copyright infringement: They knowingly provide a financial
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. at 2117.
See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005).
Tiffany Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 576 F. Supp. 2d 463 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int'l Serv. Ass'n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007).
Id. at 810.
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bridge between buyers and sellers of pirated works, enabling them to
consummate infringing transactions, all while making a profit on every
sale."16 This view was expressed in a dissent, but it seems to have
considerable influence. The danger of the imposition of secondary
liability remains strong enough, even in the wake of these decisions, to
create a chilling effect of the kind that other areas of the law assiduously
avoid. Such a view bespeaks a general failure of the law to recognize
the extent to which secondary liability signals a sweeping social
reconfiguration in which all segments of society are to bear a
responsibility to tend to the property of one segment.
The
transformation is also asymmetric, for no corresponding burden is placed
on the content industries to tend to the public good. Apart from serving
as an indication of an immediate lack of symmetry, this development
portends the enshrinement of a legal order whose hallmark is a glaring
inconsistency.
This Essay argues that the growth of secondary liability actions
represents a larger attempt to impose a general obligation to protect the
copyrights of the content industries, and that the full significance of
secondary liability cannot be understood unless it is considered
alongside other manifestations of this tendency. This Essay contends
that secondary liability takes on a much greater meaning when it is seen
as closely related to other efforts in extending responsibility for
protecting copyrights: in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, in
various measures intended to increase the government's responsibility
for copyright enforcement, in attempts to make universities accountable
to the content industries, and in the inconsistency in the operation of
copyright law. This Essay continues by noting that one very serious
defect that is emerging in the secondary liability jurisprudence is a
tendency not to consider the role of the downstream user, who is often
imagined to be the direct infringer necessary to support the secondary
liability theories, in any careful way. This Essay argues that copyright
law needs to recognize the character of downstream use by adopting an
overbreadth doctrine similar to that found in First Amendment
overbreadth jurisprudence. It concludes by observing that intellectual
property is inherently unstable and is becoming more so, and that the
extension of secondary liability is a predictable and dangerous outcome
of a misplaced desire to protect what is increasingly difficult to protect.
I. SECONDARY LIABILITY WITHOUT DIRECT INFRINGEMENT:

16. Id. at 811.
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17

In order to appreciate the significance of secondary liability it is
important to recognize that it has close cousins: cognate theories
intended to spread responsibility for the copyrights of the content
industries, which open the possibility of incurring liability even in the
absence of actual acts of infringement. The DMCA provides the
functional equivalent of secondary liability by virtue of imposing
liability on one who provides a device capable of circumvention.' Yet
it goes farther than garden-variety secondary liability. As some circuits
have interpreted the DMCA, there can be a DMCA violation even in the
absence of an allegation of infringement connected to the circumvention
"device."' 9 Secondary liability is an interesting enough phenomenon in
its own right, but it becomes far more so when it is not accompanied by
actual infringement.
Standing on its own, secondary liability might not seem either
unusual or dangerous, yet it is part of a growing number of
inconsistencies that are creating a crisis of their own in American
jurisprudence. Considered alongside a number of other developments,
secondary liability takes on a rather different appearance as part of an
exception to a standard principle of American law that does not impose
obligations on parties who have not assented to them. This exception is
part of a growing pattern of overreaching and inconsistency in the law of
copyright both internally and by comparison with other areas. An
invitation to both inconsistency and overreaching are found in the
Copyright Act itself, which allows the copyright plaintiff to recover
without proof of injury.20 As I have noted previously, such a rule plainly
departs from the American rule of standing, which generally requires
concrete particular injury.21 Moreover, the measure of recovery in the
absence of injury--statutory damages in copyright and enhanced
damages in patent law--does not square easily with the private property
rationale that is increasingly used by the content industries as
justification for the extension of intellectual property laws. The
inconsistency is also evident when copyright comes into collision with
other areas of the law, as in the case of claims related to software which
are met with First Amendment defenses.
First Amendment

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 U.S.C.S. § 1201 etseq.
Id.
See Universal v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001).
See 17 USCS § 504.
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).
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jurisprudence conducted under an intermediate level of scrutiny is thus
far no match for copyright protection. Software is expressive enough to
enjoy copyright protection, but not expressive enough to merit real First
protection, i.e., adjudication under a strict scrutiny
Amendment
22
standard.
This inconsistency between copyright and the First Amendment
may be the most instructive, for it presents an opportunity to recognize
the public character of copyright and to readjust the protection of
software under both copyright and patent law in favor of a more
The failure to
considered and judicious software jurisprudence.
recognize the public character of these disputes is among the most
important of the problems to be addressed, for despite the special and
ever-growing protections offered to the holder of intellectual property
rights, adjudication of the most important intellectual property issues are
typically treated simply as disputes between private parties--even when,
as noted above, plaintiffs seek to impose liability on defendants on the
basis of infringement by others. Indeed, when the various components
of the content industries' plan to secure protection are assembled, it
becomes very obvious that the problem is a public one.
As discussed more fully below, copyright might take instruction
from the First Amendment. For whatever its defects, First Amendment
jurisprudence addresses concerns beyond those of the parties, and it thus
offers a model capable of recognizing the public character of secondary
liability claims.

II. THE INDISTINCT THEORY OF SECONDARY LIABILITY
In the copyright arena secondary liability has rather indistinct
origins, both historically and philosophically. The Patent Act provides
directly for secondary liability, but the Copyright Act does not, and
cases such as Sony2 3 have made clear that the concept comes on loan
from the Patent Act. Although the Sony ruling itself may be regarded as
a permissive one that makes it more difficult to establish secondary
liability, it also set a precedent that has become dangerous for its
tendency to allow some to become liable for infringement by others.24
The danger comes from the assumptions that underlie secondary
liability as plaintiffs have sought to apply it in recent years. These
assumptions have not often been fully explored, but they seem to include
22. See 321 Studios v. MGM Studios, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1100 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
23. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,442 (1984).
24. Seeid..at417.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2009

7

Akron Intellectual Property Journal, Vol. 3 [2009], Iss. 1, Art. 6
AKRON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY JOURNAL

[3:171

several principles. First, the Copyright Act must provide an effective
remedy for infringement, regardless of how easy it becomes to infringe
and how difficult infringement becomes to deter.2 5 Second, there is a
closely related belief that direct infringement must be defined more
expansively as more effective--and harder to police--ways to distribute
come into existence, the tendency of which is to permit holders of
existing copyrights to control new means of distribution developed by
others. Next, whether we consider the right and ability to control under
a vicarious liability theory, or the issue of material contribution under a
contributory infringement theory, there is a strong tendency to impose
burdens on third parties to a degree which would clearly be
impermissible in other areas of law, such as the First Amendment.2 6 The
result has been to tempt the law into seeing the right and ability to
control where there has previously been no such right, and where there
should be none, and likewise to view the provision of infringementneutral resources as materially contributing to infringement.
The worldview of the proponents of secondary liability divides the
world of copyright into providers whose interests must be protected, and
consumers, who may conveniently be thought of as "end-users" with
severely limited rights.27 In such a worldview the internet can be thought
of only in terms of two starkly opposed alternatives: as a commercial
marketplace jointly owned by private entities and governed on their
behalf, or as a permanent monument and inducement to piracy.
Given the varied results in the cases, it is difficult to see how far the
law has accepted the premises of secondary liability and the related
characterizations of the internet. It is telling, however, that while the
providers' point of view is well-represented, there is no reliable
corresponding characterization drawn from the "consumer's" point of
view. The closest seems to be the "substantial non-infringing use"
enunciated in Sony 8 , but even in Sony it was not articulated in a very
specific way, and the Grokster decision suggests that the Supreme Court
is not anxious to jump into Sony's uncertain waters. 29 Nor is there a
very robust characterization of the internet in more public terms, terms

25.
1990).
26.
1994).
27.
28.
29.

See Cable/Home Commc'n Corp. v. Network Prod.s, Inc., 902 F.2d 829, 849 (1Ith Cir.
Polygram Int'l Publ'g v. Nevada/TIG, Inc., 855 F. Supp. 1314, 1320-21 (Mass.Dist. Ct.
See Zenith Data Sys. v. Dep't of Treasury, 218 Mich. App. 742, 748 (1996).
Sony, 464 U.S. at 789.
See MGM Studios, 545 U.S. at 913.
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drawn from the users' points of view. In Reno v. ACL U, the Supreme
Court treated the internet as a public forum. Justice Stevens noted that
the wide variety of information on the Internet includes "traditional print
and news services," and that "any person with a phone line can become a
town crier3 with a voice that resonates farther than it could from any
soapbox.", 1

This description has not made its way into the law of intellectual
property. As a consequence, the public that uses the forum and the uses
that they make of it have not inserted themselves in a very serious way
into intellectual property law, which tends to see the downstream user
only as an instrument of copyright holders. The result is that while
intellectual property law is reluctant to see the user of the internet as a
town crier, it is quite prepared to see her either as a consumer or as a
pirate.
Thus the law has not squarely recognized the legal personality of
the downstream user. To put this somewhat differently, with reference
to the famous Brandeis and Warren essay on the inadequate protection
of the right of privacy,32 the theory of secondary liability does not
recognize a theory of the "inviolate personality" of the internet user.
Rather, this unfortunate individual is cast involuntarily into a chain of
production and consumption whose behavior is governed by copyright
holders.33
In secondary liability jurisprudence the manner in which this
"downstream user" appears is enlightening to the point of being
dispositive. A reader could easily figure out the outcome of many cases
simply by reading the view that a particular court took of downstream
users, as well as of the kind of downstream use that it envisioned. To
take a few well-known examples, in Universal v. Corley,3 4 in deciding
whether DVD-decryptive software known as "deCSS" violated the anticircumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA, the Second
Circuit declined to consider the non-infringing use of deCSS that might
be made by downstream Linux users who wished to play DVDs on their
Linux machines. On the other hand, the court displayed far greater
interest in illegal downstream use and freely expressed its fear of

30. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
31. Id.at 870
32. Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 205
(1890).

33. See id.
34. 273 F.3d 429, 442 (2d Cir. 2001).
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completely hypothetical downstream acts of direct infringement.35 The
result: DMCA liability in the absence of actual infringement. By
contrast, in Chamberlain v. Skylink,3 6 a case involving garage door
openers and universal remote controls that allegedly violated the
DMCA, the Federal Circuit focused closely on the downstream
homeowner, no more an actual party to the case than the downstream
Linux user in Corley. The Result? No liability under the DMCA.
In Davidson v. Jung,37 in deciding whether the defendants fell afoul
of the DMCA by providing an alternative but unauthorized internet
gaming environment on which popular Blizzard games could be played,
the Eighth Circuit paid very close attention to hypothetical end-users
who might use the alternative environment in order to play pirated
games. The result went beyond Corley and ended in liability under the
DMCA in the absence of infringement, despite the fact that the
offending online environment could not be used in the creation of
infringing copies of Blizzard games. The online environment only
provided a "content-neutral" space in which lawful purchasers and
infringers alike could play online, away from Blizzard's watchful eyes
and without performing the "secret handshake" required to play in
Blizzard's authorized online environment.38
I have observed elsewhere the departure that decisions such as
Corley and Davidson mark in restricting some people in the use of their
own creations and others in the use of their purchases, 39 but the cases
also have important implications for secondary liability, placing a
burden on creators to control the behavior of end-users, and betraying
real reluctance (or inability) to conceive of non-infringing uses in any
4 1 court was able to imagine such
serious way.40 While the Chamberlain
non-infringing uses, we must wonder whether that is simply because the
homeowner that was locked out of her garage was so easy to see and so
sympathetic as well. What of end-users who are less easy to imagine or

35. See id. at 452.
36. See 381 F.3d 1178 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
37. See 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
38. Id.
39. Liam S6amus O'Melinn, Software and Shovels: How the IntellectualPropertyRevolution
is Undermining TraditionalConcepts of Property,76 U. CiN. L. REv. 143, 174-75 (2007).
40. We need not explore the extent to which fair use might have constitutional protection,
grounded on either the First Amendment or the Copyright Clause, because whatever
validity a constitutional claim might have as to an application of the DMCA that impairs
fair use of copyrighted materials, such matters are far beyond the scope of this lawsuit for
several reasons. Universal v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458-59 (2d Cir. 2001).
41. See Chamberlain,381 F.3dat 1196.
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less easy to sympathize with, even though their uses may be noninfringing and far from hypothetical? The law does not yet seem to have
found a reliable place for them, or an opportunity to bring their noninfringing personalities to bear on problems that will undoubtedly affect
them.
III. MAKING THE GOVERNMENT DO THE WORK: U.S. V. CHALUPNIK42
It is worth mentioning a few points here whose full development
lies outside the scope of this piece. The rise of secondary liability is part
of a program that would assign a general duty of superintendency over
the rights of intellectual property. It is but a small jump from such a
general superintendency to mandatory contributions, and serious steps
are being taken in that direction. They range from attempts to turn
universities into guarantors of the content industries' business model to
more direct law enforcement efforts. Thus universities have come under
enormous pressure to curb downloading, to strike music rental deals that
create a perpetual revenue stream for the music industry, and even to
teach students the principles of copyright law (presumably as understood
by RIAA/MPAA).
More ominously, the government is being made into an agency of
the industries as the latest legislation shows rather clearly, and this is all
of a piece with the spirit of secondary liability. The Prioritizing
Resources and Organization for Intellectual Property Act provides that
"the President shall appoint" an Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator.43 The act also provides for the forfeiture of property used
or "intended to be used" in the commission of prohibited acts. 44 Where
this might lead is uncertain, but the goal is clear. As Rep. Zoe Lofgren
observed in opposing the measure, the intent is to attack the internet.,
and if downloaders are not discouraged by the staggering statutory
damages that they already face under the law, then perhaps the loss of
their (or their parents') computers will stop them and deter their
friends.45 If not, perhaps the loss of their houses will suffice. Although
that seems a fanciful fear, the new law specifies that forfeiture
procedures are to be governed by the standards set by the Drug Abuse

42.
43.
44.
45.

514 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2008).
H. R. 4279, Title 111(A) §301(b), 110th Cong. (2007).
See generally id.
See supranote 1.
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Prevention and Control Act, which does call to mind some draconian
forfeitures.46
The transfer of enforcement duties to the government was already
underway before the bill was passed. An otherwise mysterious Eighth
Circuit case decided early in 2008, U.S. v. Chalupnik,47 shows this
nicely, and it illustrates another link in the chain that includes secondary
liability. Chalupnik worked as a janitorial supervisor for the U.S. Postal
Service and over several years he collected CDs that had been marked
for disposal, apparently pursuant to a contract that the Post Office had
with music companies, "to gather and discard undeliverable discs, as it
was less costly for BMG to produce replacement discs than to pay for
the return and restocking of undeliverable discs. 48 It is not entirely
clear from the facts whether the Postal Service was simply supposed to
throw the disks out, or to oversee their destruction. For some reason the
Postal Service began to monitor Chalupnik, and he was discovered to
have 3,580 CDs and 125 DVDs in his possession. He admitted to
having sold CDs and DVDs, which would otherwise have been disposed
of, to music stores for a total of $78,818.49
There was no evidence that BMG held copyrights in any of the
disks. ° Pursuant to a plea agreement, Chalupnik pleaded guilty to
criminal copyright infringement, and the District Court ordered him to
repay $78,818 in restitution to BMG. 5' On appeal, the Eighth Circuit
held that BMG qualified as a victim under the Mandatory Victims
Restitution Act (MVRA), but it vacated the restitution award on the
any actual loss suffered by
ground that the government had not 5proved
2
BMG and remanded for proof of loss.

The split decision affirming conviction but vacating and remanding
for resentencing indicates that the court was acting fairly, but the
reasoning in the case is nonetheless alarming. The initial charge against
Chalupnik appears to have been felony mail theft; the District Court
characterized his actions as the conversion of BMG's property held by

46. The forfeiture of property under paragraph 1, including any seizure and disposition
of the property and any related judicial or administrative proceeding, shall be governed
by the procedures set forth in section 413 of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention

and Control Act of 1970 (21 U.S.C. 853), other than subsection (d) of that section. 76
PATENT, COPYRIGHT, AND TRADEMARK J. 776, 779 (Oct. 3, 2008).

47. 514 F.3d 748 (8th Cir. 2008).
48.
49.

Id. at 750.
Id.at 751.

50. Id.
51.

Id.at 750

52. Id.
at 755.
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the Postal Service as a bailee (of property headed for the dumpster), and
it was this that led the Eighth Circuit to conclude that BMG was
damaged in the manner contemplated by the MVRA.5 3 As the court
noted, however, BMG54 could not itself have sued Chalupnik for
copyright infringement.
Chalupnik introduced some interesting propositions, perhaps the
most interesting being the government's argument on appeal "that BMG
should receive restitution on behalf of the unidentified copyright owners
who would have been paid royalties had BMG sold the purloined
discs." 55 The court rejected the argument 56, but that result affects only
the amount of the relief, if any, and not whether BMG was properly
considered a victim under the MVRA. Functionally speaking, the
government prosecuted a copyright infringement case on behalf of
BMG, which BMG itself would not have had standing to bring as a civil
infringement claim. At least secondary liability has a name and an
intelligible basis, and although the principle underlying the Chalupnik
case seems a bizarre extension of secondary liability, it is difficult to
know what to call it or how to justify it.
Chalupnik fits into the overall picture of which secondary liability
is just one part. Even in the absence of a principle by which to explain
the case, the recent extension of the duties of government in the
copyright arena sounds a warning. Chalupnik pairs with the general
secondary liability issue in a way that shows that the law of copyright
has become dangerously overbroad. Secondary liability provides for
liability for the acts of others, the DMCA permits liability for
hypothetical infringing acts of others, and Chalupnik allows both for
liability for the unauthorized sale of copyrighted materials earmarked for
disposal, as well as recovery by the government on behalf of a party who
does not hold any of the copyrights.
IV. A SOLUTION: THE SPIRIT OF SONYAND
OVERBREADTH JURISPRUDENCE

By virtue of the statement that it silently makes about social
relationships and obligations, the rationale that supports the extension of
vicarious liability also helps to supply the basis on which it might be
reigned in. A comparison with First Amendment jurisprudence is
53.
54.
55.
56.

Id.at 753-54.
Id. at 753.
Id.at 755.
Id.
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instructive because it highlights the inconsistencies mentioned earlier
and it suggests a model that would help to address the problems
presented by the rise of secondary liability. The point here is not to
chide intellectual property law for failing to worship at the First
Amendment shrine, nor to have the First Amendment reign supreme
over copyright, but to recognize the public character of the secondary
liability crisis via the adoption of relevant First Amendment precepts.
Although the law says that copyright and the First Amendment
work in pari materia, that is not always So.57 In many respects copyright
is not currently the engine of First Amendment free expression, yet they
can and should be made compatible. Copyright law need not be
subordinated to the First Amendment, but it might borrow some useful
doctrines in the way that it has borrowed from patent law. The various
theories under which secondary liability are prosecuted operate on a
view of society, as noted above, in which producers deliver content to
consumers, who are in turn obligated to tend to the producers' property.
The theories thus quietly and perhaps even unwittingly outline a desired
state of social relations in a way that is not readily acknowledged by the
law of intellectual property, a way that recognizes copyright as public
rather than private law, and they thus invite reconsideration of the social
relations that ought to underlie the law. This is something that the First
Amendment is actually good at, for it often forces us to look beyond the
possibly narrow interests of the parties immediately before the court and
toward a broader social interest.
I have noted elsewhere that despite the importation of the First
Amendment into the laws governing computer code, the results fall far
short of upholding First Amendment values.58 In Corley the introduction
of the First Amendment led to what I call "overbreadth in reverse," 59
according to which the court condoned the suppression of actual and
legitimate speech in order to prohibit largely hypothetical infringement.
Whether it is legitimate for copyright law to attempt to prevent
infringement by addressing it before it occurs, the Second Circuit's
reasoning was clearly inconsistent with a First Amendment overbreadth
approach.

57. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, The DemocraticPublic Domain: Reconnecting the Modem First
Amendment and the Original Progress Clause (a.ka. Copyright and Patent Clause) 157 (Bepress
Legal Series, Working Paper, March 1, 2004), availableat http://iaw.bepress.com/expresso/eps/157.
58. See Liam Samus O'Melinn, The New Software Jurisprudenceand the Faltering First
Amendment, 6 VAND.J. ENr. L. & PRAc. 310 (2004).
59. Id.at 327.
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If we move beyond Corley and into the world of file sharing of a
more conventional kind we find a similar problem. There is tremendous
pressure to impose a burden on the developers of p2p programs to find
effective means to guard against third-party infringement. In the world
of the First Amendment, as the Supreme Court pointed out in Reno v.
ACLV 60 , such burdens are strongly disapproved. They should be
resisted still more resolutely in the murky area of secondary liability.
There are two reasons to think that reasoning in the style of the
First Amendment should prove persuasive here. The first is that
computer code has been declared to be protected by the First
Amendment, and it is therefore reasonable to think that the First
Amendment should thus actually affect outcomes. 6' Additionally, as
suggested above, the invitation to reassess the role of intellectual
property in its broader social setting by spreading liability widely has
come from the industries, and the very issues that they have raised thus
lead naturally toward such a reexamination.
The results of the
reexamination may not be precisely what they seek, but they have
invited the inquiry.
The suggested inquiry proceeds along something like First
Amendment overbreadth lines, which would allow a court to take
account of the interests of parties beyond the case. This is a standard
feature of First Amendment overbreadth jurisprudence, and the
circumstances surrounding secondary liability cases present just as broad
a set of social issues as do traditional First Amendment cases. Indeed,
by their very nature secondary liability theories demand that we take
some account of people who are not parties to the case, and it would
make sense to do so in a systematic fashion. Procedural safeguards
might include evidentiary hearings intended to answer questions
regarding the nature of "end-user" behavior in order to come to reasoned
conclusions on such issues as substantial non-infringing uses, or to
consider whether the outcome of the case is likely to affect legitimate
use of a kind that is either not obvious to the parties or simply
unimportant to them, such as non-infringing uses of p2p software.
Moreover, the suggestion is not fanciful, because it calls simply for
a more systematic application of the spirit of Sony, which proceeds on
grounds very similar to overbreadth. Some infringement is to be
allowed in order to preserve the rights of non-infringers who are not

60. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
61. U.S. v. Elcom Ltd., 203 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1126-27 (N.D. Cal. 2002).
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parties to the case.62 What this means in general terms is a heightened
level of scrutiny for cases with broad social implications; in this regard
the issue of secondary liability actually goes well beyond the First
Amendment, for although it often implicates traditional First
Amendment expression, it also affects various kinds of behavior that
must be protected in a free society, such as playing games, listening to
music, and watching movies. In cases of secondary liability it has been
too easy to assume that the excluded downstream user is a direct
infringer, but the assumption is becoming ever more questionable as
uses and users have multiplied, and as theories of direct infringement
themselves have expanded in a dubious fashion.
In particular, given that the music and movie industries wish to
assert a direct moral equivalence between downloading and car theft, it
is a fair question to ask how the law-abiding homeowner views the issue,
and how she acts upon it as well. The image of the teenage pirate has
been allowed to dominate the intellectual property debates, with
predictable results. The results may be quite different if the image
changes to the person who ordinarily respects property rights. Our
approach to secondary liability has, as yet, no well-defined place for that
person. But it should.
In Eldred v. Ashcroft 3 the Supreme Court indicated that
constitutional review of copyright law might call for a heightened level
of First Amendment scrutiny in the event of a departure from the
traditional contours of copyright law. The current departure, in which
secondary liability plays an important part, is far more than a departure
from copyright principles: It has informed patent and trademark law as
well. It has used the language and theory of conventional rights in a
manner that is inconsistent with the departure that we have seen, and it
now calls for a redistribution of rights in a way that threatens to make
property rights meaningless. 64
The threats need not be realized, and the implementation of legal
standards that recognize the nature of the problem that lies at the heart of
secondary liability will help to ensure that they are not.
CONCLUSION: THE INSTABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

If there were no other reason to resist the theories of secondary
liability, the instability of intellectual property would provide sufficient
62. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,499 (1984).
63. 537 U.S. 186, 221 (2003).
64. See generally, O'Melinn, supra note 39.
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cause.
Intellectual property is inherently unstable, because the
"products" governed by the law of intellectual property are meant to be
shared. On what terms and at what price are the questions. Intellectual
property is becoming even more unstable now that copying and
transmission are becoming cheaper and easier than ever to accomplish.
Why be so attentive to the protection of property that is so
unstable? We live under a myth made famous by John Locke that is
now used to justify property as an individual entitlement, and while the
myth has real virtues it also has some vices. Specifically, it tempts us to
forget that property has traditionally received protection under the law in
part because it is stable. Historically, real property has been regarded as
most stable, and its holders have enjoyed commensurate social and legal
status. Real property did not go anywhere, and it could thus be counted
on by government.
To treat property that goes everywhere, and that is meant to go
everywhere, in a similar fashion is to invite grave difficulties. To do so
requires serious departures from traditional legal and social principles,
yet departures that must be made silently lest the differences between
real property and intellectual property become obvious. The rise of
secondary liability is indicative of such changes, and as long as the law
dedicates itself single-mindedly to the protection of unstable property,
we can expect development to continue along its present course.
Fortunately, there are signs that the principles that underlie secondary
liability are being challenged. In order for the challenge to be effective,
it will be important to recognize the premises of secondary liability more
forthrightly, to understand the general picture of which secondary
liability is simply one part, and to fashion a legal answer that provides a
greater measure of consistency to the law.
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